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Staking Out the Border Between Commandeering 
and Conditional Preemption: Is the Driver's 
Privacy Protection Act Constitutional 
Under the Tenth Amendment? 
Rachel F. Preiser* 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 
("DPPA") in response to state sales of personal information contained 
in motor vehicle records to individuals and to direct marketing com­
panies who use it to identify select groups of prospective customers for 
particular products.1 Thirty-four states sell their department of motor 
vehicles ("DMV") records to individual citizens and to direct market­
ers, essentially allowing their unregulated distribution to any party 
seeking them.2 This practice of selling and distributing personal in­
formation has serious implications for the privacy and safety of indi­
vidual citizens.3 
In considering the DPP A, Congress dwelt in particular on the use 
of DMV information by murderers, robbers, and stalkers to identify 
their victims.4 In California, a man who had hired a private detective 
to obtain the address of actress Rebecca Shaeffer from the state 
department of motor vehicles brutally murdered her in the doorway of 
her Los Angeles apartment.5 Another California resident copied 
* Thanks to Professors Donald Regan and Roderick Hills for their last-minute com­
ments and critique. I take full responsibility for the content of this piece. 
1. Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA ") of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-2725 ( West 
Supp. 1998). Personal information collected by state motor vehicle departments {DMVs) 
includes names, addresses, and social security numbers of registered drivers. 
2 See 139 CONG. REC. 29,469 (1993) (statement of Sen. Robb); see also Michael W. 
Miller, Firms Peddle Information from Driver's Licenses, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1991, at Bl. 
According to Miller, "[m]ost drivers who register for a license have no idea their personal 
information finds its way into the hands of marketers." In a 1993 article for the Boston 
Globe, Larry Tye described our information age as "a time when invisible list-makers have 
replaced door-to-door salesmen ... and marketers swap the details of our private lives like 
baseball cards. " See Larry Tye, No Private Lives: List-makers Draw a Bead on Many, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. 
3. See Protecting Driver Privacy: Legislative Hearing on H.R. 3365 Before the Subcomm. 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 322 
(1994) (statement of Dr. Mary J. Culnan, Associate Professor, School of Business, 
Georgetown University). 
4. See 139 CONG. REC. 29,467 (1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
5. See id. at 29,466 (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
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down the license plate numbers of five young women and sent them 
threatening letters after obtaining their home addresses from the 
California DMV.6 Anti-abortion groups have long used license plate 
numbers of cars parked in front of abortion clinics to track down and 
harass women seeking abortions by obtaining their addresses from 
DMV records.7 
The abandon with which DMVs sell the complete contents of their 
records on registered drivers to national marketing companies is 
equally disconcerting. These national marketers specialize in identi­
fying the overweight, divorced, wealthy, or short in stature in order to 
assist enterprises eager to target the consumer base most responsive to 
their form of solicitation.8 Because the compilation, analysis, and dis­
tribution of such information is in fact an important national industry, 
accounting for five percent of U.S. employment and $350 billion in 
annual revenue,9 the regulation of that industry is an area of immedi­
ate national concem.10 
The DPPA regulates the distribution of DMV personal informa­
tion by placing a prohibition both on state and individual activities. 
First, the Act prohibits states from freely releasing personal informa­
tion from state DMV records.11 It then enumerates the conditions un­
der which states may continue to distribute DMV information - if 
they choose not to abandon the field to federal control - and limits 
6. See id. 
7. See id. at 29,469 (statement of Sen. Robb). 
8. See Miller, supra note 2. 
9. See Tye, supra note 2. In describing the burgeoning direct marketing industry, Tye 
notes: 
Id. 
[A]s marketing in America becomes more and more targeted, more and more people are 
wondering whether it's an unacceptable invasion of privacy ... [a]nd whether the old system 
of self-regulation makes sense for a direct marketing industry that, according to a [Direct 
Marketing Association]-sponsored analysis of everything from advertising to computer 
services, accounts for 5 percent of US employment and $350 billion in anntiill revenues. 
10. Editor and author Anne Fadiman recently commented on the mass marketing del­
uge of the information age in Ex Libris: Confessions of a Common Reader. Ms. Fadiman 
notes, in her chapter entitled "The Catalogical Imperative": 
I have never actually solicited a catalogue. Although it is tempting to conclude that our 
mailbox hatches them by spontaneous generation, I know they are really the offspring of 
promiscuous mailing lists, which copulate in secret and for money. One of the ... horrors of 
the direct mail business is that you never know to whom your name will be pandered. 
ANNE FADIMAN, Ex LIBRIS: CONFESSIONS OF A COMMON READER 114 {1998); see also 
infra Part I for a discussion of the constitutionality of federal regulation of the distribution of 
DMV records under the Commerce Clause. 
11. Part (a) of the statute provides: "[A] State department of motor vehicles, and any 
officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or ofuerwise make 
available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the 
department in connection wifu a motor vehicle record. " Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 
1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 272l{a) (West Supp. 1998). 
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the redistribution of that information by authorized individuals who 
obtain it from the DMV.12 The state may opt out of the regulatory 
scheme entirely by placing a notice on all of its official forms indicat­
ing that personal information collected may be freely disclosed and 
providing the opportunity for any registrant to prohibit such disclo­
sure.13 
Three of the four district courts that have considered challenges to 
the DPPA have held the law unconstitutional, although two of those 
12. The permissible uses are enumerated in part {b) of section 2721 as follows: 
{l) For use by any government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in 
carrying out its functions . . • .  
(2) For use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft • • • •  
(3) For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business or its agents, employ­
ees, or contractors, but only-
(A) to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual ... and 
(B) if such information as so submitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the 
correct information, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal 
remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual. 
( 4) For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding • • • •  
(5) For use in research activities, and for use in producing statistical reports, so long as the 
personal information is not published, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals. 
( 6) For use by any insurer or insurance support organization . • • •  
(7) For use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles. 
(8) For use by any licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service for any 
purpose permitted under this subsection. 
(9) For use by an employer • . •  to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a com· 
mercial driver's license • . • •  
(10) For use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities. 
(11) For any other use in response to requests for individual motor vehicle records if the mo· 
tor vehicle department has provided in a clear and conspicuous manner on [its J forms . • •  no· 
tice that personal information • . .  may be disclosed to any business or person, and has pro· 
vided in a clear and conspicuous manner on such forms an opportunity to prohibit such 
disclosures. 
(12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the motor vehicle de­
partment has implemented methods and procedures to ensure that-
individuals are provided an opportunity, in a clear and conspicuous manner, to prohibit 
such uses • . . •  
(13) For use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates it has obtained the written con· 
sent of the individual to whom the information pertains. 
(14) For any other use specifically authorized under the law of the State that holds the rec· 
ord, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. 
18 U.S.C. §2721(b.). The law goes on to limit the resale or redisclosure of personal informa· 
tion obtained from DMV records by "authorized recipients " as follows: 
An authorized recipient of personal information • . •  may resell or redisclose the information 
only for a use permitted under subsection (b) (but not for uses under subsection (b)(ll) or 
(12)) . . • •  Any authorized recipient (except a recipient under subsection (b)(ll)) that resells 
or rediscloses personal information covered by this title must keep for a period of 5 years re­
cords identifying each person or entity that receives information and the permitted purpose 
for which the information will be used and must make such records available to the motor 
vehicle department upon request. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 2721(c). 
13. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 272l(b){ll) (quoted supra note 12). 
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three were reversed on appeal.14 At both the district and appellate 
court levels, dispute over the Act focuses not on whether it falls within 
Congress's Article I commerce power, but rather on the question of 
whether the Act impermissibly regulates the states in violation of the 
limitations on federal power imposed by the Tenth Amendment.15 Al­
though the Supreme Court has established that the two inquiries are, 
in theory, two sides of the same coin,16 courts have often treated them 
independently.17 
The first inquiry deserves more serious attention than courts 
evaluating the DPPA have given it. Under modem Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, which posits relatedness to the interstate exchange of 
goods and services as the touchstone for the federal commerce 
power,18 the DPPA seems a valid exercise of congressional authority. 
Under a more functional, less formalistic view of the Commerce 
Clause proposed by Professor Donald Regan, the question of whether 
the DPPA passes muster is less clear-cut. This view of the Commerce 
Clause extends federal power only to areas of concern to the nation as 
a nation, that the states are not competent to regulate independently.19 
The DPPA may address such an issue. The second inquiry, like the 
first, is concerned with whether the federal government is using the 
14. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding the DPPA constitu­
tional), rev'd, 171F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999); Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 
1998) (holding the DPPA unconstitutional), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma 
ex rel Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 994 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D. Okla. 1997) 
(holding the DPPA unconstitutional), rev'd, 161F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Condon v. Reno, 
972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997) (holding the DPPA unconstitutional), aff'd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th 
Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999). 
15. See, e.g., Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 982-86 (holding the DPPA unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Tenth Amendment and finding that the statute cannot be justified as an ex­
ercise of the commerce power). 
16. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in New York v. United States, asserted 
that these two questions - the extent of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and 
the extent of the domain of sovereignty reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment 
- "are mirror images of each other." 505 U. S. 144, 156 (1992). 
17. See, e.g., New York, 505 U. S. at 160. The New York Court struck down a provision 
of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act requiring states either to regulate �aste dis­
posal according to federal standards or to take title to radioactive waste produced within 
their borders. Although the regulation of radioactive waste disposal at issue in New York 
clearly fell within Congress's interstate commerce power, the Court struck down the "take­
title" provision of the Act on Tenth Amendment grounds. 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free 
School Zone Act is not within the federal commerce power because it is too remote from 
commerce both in character and purpose). 
19. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Inci­
dentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 580-81 (1995) (arguing that 
the only viable alternative to the accretion of unworkable formalisms within Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence is an approach that focuses on whether a federal law enacted under the 
commerce power in fact seeks to achieve a national interest that could not be achieved by 
the separate states). 
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states to accomplish a federal objective that is beyond its enumerated 
powers. In pursuing this Tenth Amendment inquiry, however, the 
Court has been primarily concerned with the mode of regulation 
rather than whether a federal law regulates an appropriate domain. 
The Court in New York v. United States struck down the "take-title" 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act on the 
grounds that it "commandeered" state legislatures to develop a feder­
ally prescribed regulatory program, while recognizing that the domain 
of regulation was within federal power.20 The Court expanded on this 
anti-commandeering rule in Printz v. United States, holding that the 
federal government could not circumvent the rule simply by com­
manding state officers rather than the state itself.21 The Court found 
that laws that commandeer the states violate the Tenth Amendment 
and fundamental federalist principles by allowing the federal govern­
ment to operate indirectly through the states, thereby avoiding finan­
cial and political responsibility for federal policies.22 
The two circuit courts that have held the DPPA unconstitutional 
found that the burden of compliance upon states violates the anti­
commandeering precedent laid down by New York and Printz.13 In 
holding the DPPA unconstitutional, these courts state that the DPPA 
conscripts state officers into federal service by requiring them to be­
come familiar with and implement new standards for the release of 
DMV information.24 One district court has also based its decision to 
enjoin the law's application on the burdensome fines it imposes on 
noncompliant states.25 
20. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161. 
21. 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (holding that a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act requiring state officials to conduct background checks on all prospective gun 
purchasers impennissibly commandeered state officers to administer and enforce a federal 
regulatory scheme). The Printz Court stated that "where, as here, it is the whole object of 
the law to direct the fµnctioning of the state executive," the law violates the Tenth Amend­
ment protection of state sovereignty against federal incursion. Id. 
22 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69. The New York Court noted: 
[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who 
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regula­
tory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decisions. Ac­
countability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot 
regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by 
federal regulation. 
ld at 169. 
23. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 
(4th Cir.1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999). 
24. See Pryor, 171 F.3d at 1286; Condon, 155 F3d at 456-57 (quoting the district court 
decision, Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979-81 (D.S.C.1997)). 
25. See Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 994 F.Supp. 
1358, 1364 (W.D. Okla. 1997), rev'd, 161 F3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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In contrast, the district court in Pryor v. Reno and several appellate 
courts have upheld the DPPA26 by relying on earlier Supreme Court 
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, often referred to as the Garcia line 
of cases.27 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
the Court held that the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act should be applied to state, as well as private, 
employers.28 In so doing, Garcia rejected the prohibition on federal 
regulation of states as states in domains of traditional state function 
that had been established by National League of Cities v. Usery.29 The 
courts that have upheld the DPP A, relying on the Garcia line of cases, 
rest their decisions on the distinction between federal laws that com­
mandeer the states and federal laws that simply require state compli­
ance in order to take effect. 
The New York and Printz decisions are in some tension with the 
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that immediately followed Garcia, 30 
because they rely to some extent on pre-Garcia formalisms regarding 
dual sovereignty.31 The split between the courts on the constitutional­
ity of the DPPA testifies to this tension, for the disagreement turns on 
the question of which of the two competing lines of precedent should 
control.32 While acknowledging the tension in Tenth Amendment ju-
26. See Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171F.3d 1281 (11th 
Cir. 1999); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma, �rel. Oklahoma Dep't 
of Pub. Safety, 161F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998). 
27. The Garcia line of cases is generally taken to include cases which preceded Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), including EEOC v. 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), and Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264 (1981), as well as some 
which followed in the course it charted, such as South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
28. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
29. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (establishing a three-part 
test that finds a violation of state sovereignty where a federal law (1) regulates states as 
states (2) in an area of traditional state sovereignty (3) so as to directly impair the states' 
ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions). 
30. This Note refers to the cases immediately following Garcia - such as South 
Carolina v. Baker - as "the Garcia line," although Garcia may be seen as clearing the way 
not only for these cases but also for the competing line of precedent embodied in New York 
and Printz. 
31. Because the anachronistic langnage of sovereignty pervades the New York and 
Printz Courts' Tenth Amendment analysis, it is at times difficult to recognize that the 
Courts' decisions in both cases are preoccupied not with a delineation of discrete realms of 
absolute power of federal and state governments but rather with identifying unconstitutional 
modes in which the federal government has sought to exercise otherwise viable regulatory 
control. 
32. Compare, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 984 (D.S.C. 1997) ("The court 
agrees with Defendants' characterization of the DPPA and finds that the DPPA is not the 
type [of] federal legislation prohibited by New York and Printz. Rather, the court finds that 
the DPPA is analogous to the statute found constitutional in South Carolina v. Baker.") 
("The State asserts, and the Court agrees, that the DPPA falls within the prohibition of New 
York and Printz."), affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999) 
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risprudence following Garcia, courts have recently reaffirmed that the 
Garcia line remains good law.33 
Confusion over the relationship between the Garcia and New 
York-Printz lines of cases is a central feature of the disagreement over 
the constitutionality of the DPPA. The New York Court characterizes 
the laws at issue in the Garcia line of cases - laws the Court describes 
as "generally applicable," because they subject states to the same leg­
islation applicable to private parties - as posing no problem for its 
anti-commandeering principle.34 In addition, the New York and Printz 
Courts acknowledge that federal laws that preempt state regulation, or 
conditionally preempt it by allowing states to choose between preemp­
tion and implementation of federal regulations, also escape the prob­
lems posed by commandeering.35 The Courts stop short, however, of 
explicitly recognizing that laws of general applicability usually operate 
in a preemptive mode.36 This Note draws the connection between 
generally applicable laws and the mode of conditional preemption, ar­
guing that both are constitutionally unproblematic because they tend 
to preserve the fundamental federalist principle of political account­
ability. By providing a unifying federalist explanation for the privi­
leged place given to laws of general applicability and conditional pre­
emption, this Note lends coherence to the strands of Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
This Note argues for the constitutionality of the DPPA, first en­
gaging the threshold question of whether the law falls within the fed­
eral commerce power and then considering whether its legislative 
mode is permissible in light of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Part 
I argues that the DPP A is properly within the reach of Congress's 
commerce power. Part II lays the groundwork for the Tenth Amend­
ment examination of the DPP A's legislative mode, by establishing the 
relation of general applicability to commandeering and preemption in 
with Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp.1317, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
33. See West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F. 3d 752 (4th Cir. 1998). In West, the 
Fourth Circuit reconsidered the constitutionality of those provisions of the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act (the same law under attack in Garcia) that apply specifically to state employers. 
While acknowledging that Printz stressed the importance of the Tenth Amendment's limita­
tion of federal power, the court nevertheless relied on Garcia to uphold the challenged pro­
visions, stating that "neither Printz nor any other Supreme Court case has specifically over­
ruled Garcia." Id. at 760. 
34. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1992). 
35. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at 167. 
36. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 921 
(1998) (asserting that "[i]t is true as a matter of fact that most generally applicable laws • • •  
can be defended as conditional preemption of what legislators regard as a socially costly ac­
tivity"). 
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a federalism context. Part ill argues that the DPP A takes the form of 
conditional preemption rather than impermissible commandeering; 
hence, it should survive the second part of the constitutional analysis. 
I. EVALUATING THE DPPA A S  AN EXERCISE OF FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAU SE 
Congress's longstanding power to preempt state law within a field 
subject to national control is not subject to dispute.37 The preemptive 
mode of federal infringement on the states' exercise of power must, 
however, be limited to areas in which the Constitution explicitly grants 
federal control. 38 Otherwise, the national government would cease to 
be a government of enumerated powers. 
An assessment of whether the DPP A is constitutional relies on the 
determination of whether the national sale of state DMV information 
falls within the federal government's enumerated powers, specifically 
the commerce power. Section I.A demonstrates that the DPPA falls 
within the formalistic definition of the commerce power presented by 
recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence as embodied 
in United States v. Lopez. 39 Section I.B offers a more functional ap­
proach to defining the limits of the commerce power and argues that 
the DPPA may also pass muster under this analysis. 
A Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Does the DPPA Fall Within the 
Federal Commerce Power? 
To determine the constitutionality of the DPP A, one must answer 
the threshold question of whether it regulates a domain that falls 
within Congress's commerce power as enumerated in Article I, Sec­
tion 8.40 This threshold determination is a necessary prerequisite to 
justifying the mode of conditional preemption that the law takes.41 
Historically, the Court has tended towards a kind of Commerce 
Clause analysis that looks only for characteristics of commerce with-
37. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 
767 {1994). According to Gardbaum, the federal power of preemption was first clearly ar­
ticulated by the Court in New York Central Railroad v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 {1917). See 
Gardbaum, supra, at 815 n.65. 
38. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770. Gardbaum states that the "issueO of . . .  pre­
emption arise[s] only where the states and the federal government have concurrent power," 
implying that there can be no legitimate exercise of federal preemption in a given area of 
regulation unless the area falls within the federal government's control as well as that of the 
states. 
39. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 {1995). 
40. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
41. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770; see also supra text accompanying note 39; New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1992). 
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out considering the overarching purpose of a law or whether federal 
intervention is necessary to accomplish that purpose.42 That analysis 
has alternately produced excessively narrow and overbroad versions 
of the federal commerce power.43 The latter interpretation is exempli­
fied in the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in United States v. Darby.44 
In Darby, the Court held that Congress had power to prohibit the in­
terstate shipment of lumber manufactured by employees whose 
working conditions violated the Fair Labor Standards Act because the 
commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect 
interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate."45 
In contrast, several cases of the same period employed commerce­
fetishizing formalisms to restrict the scope of the Commerce Clause, 
either by excluding manufacturing from federal regulation as not 
comprehended in "commerce,"46 or by excluding from federal control 
activities that have only an indirect influence on commerce between 
the States.47 For more than half a century before Lopez, however, the 
trend had been towards an expansive view of the scope of the federal 
commerce power.48 
Although the Court attempted to narrow the potential expansive­
ness of its approach by striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act 
in Lopez, it relied on formalisms that have periodically plagued its ap­
plication of the Commerce Clause.49 Hence, the Court held that an act 
prohibiting possession of a gun within 500 feet of a school zone over­
reached the federal government's commerce power, because the law's 
42. See Regan, supra note 19, at 560-562. 
43. See Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid 
Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1995). 
44. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941) (holding that the Co=erce 
Clause was not limited to the regulation of co=erce among the states but extended to 
regulation of intrastate activities that so influenced interstate co=erce as to warrant fed­
eral regulation); see also Regan, supra note 19, at 560 nn.19-21 and accompanying text. 
45. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118. 
46. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the co=erce 
power did not authorize the regulation of bituminous coal production because production 
precedes co=erce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that fed­
eral antitrust laws did not reach a conspiracy among sugar producers because manufacture is 
not co=erce). 
47. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding 
that a federal law setting minimum wage and maximum hours for slaughterhouse workers 
went beyond the government's co=erce power because the regulation had only an "indi­
rect'' effect on interstate co=erce ). 
48. See McJohn, supra note 43, at 1. 
49. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As 
the Chief Justice explains . . .  neither the actors nor their conduct has a co=ercial charac­
ter, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident co=ercial 
nexus."); cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 550; E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16. 
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effect on and relatedness to "interstate commerce" were too remote to 
fall within the reach of the Commerce Clause.50 
The Court's analysis in Lopez nevertheless expresses the current 
state of the inquiry into the scope of the commerce power. Under this 
analysis the DPPA clearly passes muster, since it regulates a national 
market in information, involving the movement of DMV records con­
taining personal information on all of a state's licensed drivers across 
state lines.51 Because the distribution of DMV records is an interstate 
activity that enables the national exchange of personal information, 
the Commerce Clause empowers the federal government to regulate 
that activity. 
B. Is the DPPA Valid Under a Functional Approach to the 
Commerce Clause? 
Not only does the DPPA fall within the Commerce Clause ac­
cording to the formalistic analysis used in Lopez, but it also satisfies 
the more comprehensive requirements of a functional approach. Be­
cause the Lopez Court limited its inquiry to indicators of "interstate 
commerce" and failed to consider whether the purpose of the federal 
law was a nationally important one that could not be competently 
achieved by independent state regulation, it failed to provide a solid 
analytical framework for Commerce Clause doctrine.52 By focusing 
commerce clause analysis on the degree of relatedness of a regulated 
activity to the movement of goods, data, or people across state lines, 
50. See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 551 ("The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor 
contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate com­
merce. "). 
51. A "good " that both moves in interstate commerce and is essential to facilitating in­
terstate commerce - like the personal information from DMV records sold to mass market­
ers nationwide and used by them to reach national consumers - would be an "instrumen­
tality" of interstate commerce and hence within the federal commerce power. See Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 558-59 ("First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com­
merce. . . . Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat 
may come only from intrastate activities .. . .  Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes 
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, 
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. " (citations omitted)). 
52 See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no 
sense an economic activity that might . . .  substantially affect any sort of interstate com­
merce . .. .  [T]here is no indication that [Respondent] had recently moved in interstate com­
merce, and there is no requirement [in the Act] that his possession of the firearm have any 
concrete tie to interstate commerce. "); see also Regan, supra note 19, at 555 (noting that, 
although the outcome of Lopez is probably correct, the Court's analysis is "unsatisfactory "). 
The formalistic quality of the Lopez Court's analytical framework is exposed by the 
amendment to the Gun-Free School Zone Act made following the Lopez decision in order 
to render the Jaw constitutional within the Lopez guidelines. The law was amended to pro­
hibit the possession within 500 feet of a school zone of any gun that has traveled in interstate 
commerce. See 18 U. S. C. A. § 922( q)(2)( A) (West Supp. 1999). 
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the Court ignored the constitutionally significant question of whether 
a law has a nationally important purpose requiring federal implemen­
tation.s3 
A more substantive, functional analysis, advocated in the work of 
Professor Regan, would take account of the particular institutional 
structure of our government to address the question of whether a uni­
form federal regulation is necessary to effect a purpose of genuine na­
tional interest.54 The Commerce Clause grants the federal government 
legislative power to pursue such an interest, important to the nation as 
a nation and which the states are separately incompetent, or not moti­
vated, to achieve.ss If a domain proves to be within the federal com­
merce power so understood, then it is by definition suited to the legis­
lative mode of preemption. 
The DPP A, in regulating the distribution of personal information 
by state DMVs to mass marketers and others, implicates interstate 
communication and transportation, issues of genuine national inter­
est.s6 Applying Regan's definition of national interest as an interest 
that concerns the nation as a nation, the best argument in support of 
restricting distribution of DMV information in the national interest is 
that such restrictions reduce the potential danger associated with ob­
taining a license.s7 Reducing this danger decreases a burden placed 
upon interstate travel; individuals will not be forced to choose be­
tween securing their personal information and obtaining a license. 
53. See Regan, supra note 19, at 570-71. 
54. See id. at 569, 571 (arguing that federal regulation is not appropriate to address the 
problem of gun possession near schools at issue in Lopez because "[t]here is nothing in the 
background of the [Gun-Free School Zones Act] to suggest that states are less capable of 
dealing with the problem ... than the federal government; nor is there anything to suggest 
the states are inadequately motivated to do so "). 
55. See id. at 570-71. Regan supports his reading of the Commerce Clause with the lan­
guage of the sixth Virginia Resolution, approved by the Constitutional Convention on July 
17, 1787. The resolution stated "[t]hat the national legislature ought to possess the legisla­
tive rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for 
the general interests of the union, and also in those to which the States are separately in­
competent, or in which harmony of the United states may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual legislation." NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 380 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1966). 
56. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text; see also Regan, supra note 19, at 571-
73. Regan recognizes "transportation and communication " as "general interests of the un­
ion." Id. at 571. 
57. According to Regan, a "genuine interest of the nation " is more than merely an in­
terest that concerns all states in the nation. Rather, it is an interest that particularly impli­
cates the national identity and the states' ability to operate as a nation. The assessment of 
what constitutes a genuine national interest is in the first instance for Congress to make, not 
the courts. See Regan, supra note 19, at 567-73, 579-81. Although Congress has raised safety 
concerns regarding the distribution of DMV information, see supra text accompanying notes 
4-7, it has not explicitly identified that threat as a threat to national transportation, and thus, 
_Regan would not necessarily identify the regulation of DMV information as a genuine na­
tional interest. 
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The second question in determining whether the domain of DMV 
information distribution falls within the commerce power is whether 
the federal government is in fact more competent or more motivated 
than the separate states to protect the national interest effectively. On 
the one hand, pressure from a state's citizens concerned with privacy 
and safety may be a powerful motivating factor that would encourage 
the states, independently, to take the necessary measures to limit the 
distribution of the citizens' personal information. Certainly the re­
sources necessary for regulation of the distribution of DMV informa­
tion are as readily available to states as to the federal government. 
While both are competent to regulate, however, the states, unlike the 
federal government, are faced with the disincentive presented by the 
prospect of severely limiting the revenues they draw from the un­
regulated distribution of their DMV records.58 That pecuniary motiva­
tion to ignore or subvert the general privacy and safety interests of the 
people suffices to tip the balance in favor of federal regulation.59 
Therefore, while both the federal and state governments are compe­
tent to regulate the distribution of DMV records, the states may lack 
the regulatory motivation necessary to ensure the protection of na­
tional safety and privacy interests. 
Because the DPPA is within the federal government's enumerated 
power under the Commerce Clause, under the formalistic approach of 
Lopez and perhaps under the functional approach advocated by re­
cent scholarship, the mode of preemption is proper to federal regula­
tion of the distribution of DMV records. Moreover, the law addresses 
an issue potentially of national concern, one that the states independ­
ently are disinclined to adequately address due to the financial disin­
centives posed by limiting the sale of DMV records. 
II. TOEING THE GARCIA LINE: THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
IMPLICATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE FORM 
Having survived the threshold Commerce Clause inquiry, the 
DPPA must also endure the second prong of the constitutionality test 
- that is, whether the mode of the law is compatible with the Tenth 
58. See, e.g., Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "because 
Wisconsin formerly sold its records for use in creating mailing lists, and for other purposes, 
the Act deprives the state of approximately $8 million in annual revenue"). 
59. See Regan, supra note 19, at 580. Regan argues that "[e]ven if Congress has no ad­
vantage in competence, it would still have adequate reason to intervene if the states were 
motivated to ignore or subvert the general interest" 
It should be noted that a state policy respecting privacy by closing state motor vehicle 
records might conceivably have the benefit of attracting more residents to the state and 
thereby increasing the state's tax base. The countervailing power of this benefit, however, is 
difficult to assess and somewhat farfetched by comparison with the concrete loss of revenues 
that would immediately result from the cessation of the sale of DMV records. 
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Amendment: The origin of the focus on legislative mode, of primary 
concern to the New York and Printz Courts, may be traced to the 
Court's earlier decision in Garcia. By doing away with the judicial 
cataloguing of "traditional government functions"60 relegated to state 
sovereign control, Garcia paved the way for New York's and Printz's 
focus on the mode of regulation of the laws under scrutiny.61 
The relationship between the Court's decision in Garcia and the 
Court's later decisions in New York and Printz is complicated, both by 
Garcia's inattention to the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on fed­
eral authority and by New York's apparent marginalization of cases in 
the Garcia line. First, Garcia proposes that state participation in the 
political process is a sufficient limitation on federal overreaching,62 
while New York and Printz strongly reassert the role of the Tenth 
Amendment in constraining the manner in which the federal govern­
ment exercises its constitutional authority.63 Second, and equally vex­
ing for the development of a coherent Tenth Amendment jurispru­
dence, the New York Court summarily treats the Garcia line of cases 
60. The notion that realms of traditional state function were by their nature beyond fed­
eral power to regulate was articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976), and elaborated in numerous cases thereafter. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981) (listing interference with a 
state's "ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func­
tions' " as the third prong in a test of an act's validity under the commerce power); United 
States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that, although the federal gov­
ernment is entitled to remedy drunk driving on a federal enclave, the suspension of drunk 
driver's license was beyond federal power because licensing of automobile drivers is a "tradi­
tional government function"); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(holding that regulation of traffic on public roads is not a "traditional government function" 
of the state and not immune to federal control). 
61. See Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Proce­
dural Protections, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (1987) (arguing that Garcia is significant 
not merely because it declared National League of Cities unworkable, but also, more impor­
tantly, because "it calls for the development of new theories of federalism-based limitations 
on the commerce power"); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Juris­
prudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. er. REV. 341. Rapaczynski argues that the 
Garcia Court's reliance on the "national political process" to protect state power from fed­
eral incursion establishes a "process-oriented" approach to federalist problems, in which the 
political process is subject to judicial correction where it can be shown to have failed. See id. 
at 364. Although Rapaczynski acknowledges Garcia's failure to identify how exactly the 
national political process works to protect federalist values or what constitutes a defect in 
this political process, he nevertheless sees the Garcia approach as a promising alternative to 
the rigid notions of "dual sovereignty" that dominated pre-Garcia Tenth Antendment juris­
prudence. See id. at 368-69. 
62 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985). The 
Garcia Court notes that the Constitution ensures the influence of the states in the federal 
system by giving states control over the electoral qualifications for the legislative branch and 
a key role in presidential elections. See id. at 551 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2, art. II,§ 1). 
63. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992). 
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as concerned with laws of general applicability.64 This characterization 
of the Garcia line, absent any explanation of its ramifications for fed­
eralism, has been a primary source of confusion for courts in consid­
ering the DPPA's constitutionality. In short, courts have been uncer­
tain about the scope and meaning of Garcia in the wake of New 
York.65 
Part TI parses the federalism implications of general applicability 
by exploring its relation to the legislative modes of commandeering on 
the one hand and conditional preemption on the other. Section TI.A 
argues that, by shifting the focus of Tenth Amendment inquiry away 
from a formalistic cataloguing of traditional government functions, 
Garcia in fact set the stage for New York's and Printz's focus on legis­
lative mode. Section TI.B offers an explanation grounded in federalist 
principles for the New York Court's recognition that the laws at issue 
in the Garcia line do not pose the federalist problems entailed by 
commandeering. Specifically, Section TI.B argues, through the exam­
ple of South Carolina v. Baker, that the federalism implications of 
generally applicable laws are illuminated by focusing on the preemp­
tive mode in which they tend to operate. 
A. Garcia Set the Stage for New York and Printz 
The Court in Garcia held constitutional the provision of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act imposing maximum hour/minimum wage re­
quirements on state employers, thereby rejecting the blanket prohibi­
tion on the regulation of "States as States" established in National 
League of Cities.6(, The Garcia Court rejected the traditional govern­
ment function test because it offered no coherent basis for identifying 
what these most fundamental elements of state sovereignty were.67 
Moreover, the Court found that this "traditional function"-finding en­
deavor, relying on a rigid, a priori definition of state sovereignty, was 
fundamentally incompatible with the dynamic role of federalism in a 
64. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
65. See, e.g., Pryor v. Reno, 171F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1999); Condon v. Reno, 
155 F.3d 453, 460-63 (4th Cir.1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999). 
66. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845, 852 (1976); see also 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-557. 
67. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39. The Garcia Court noted, for example, that under the 
"traditional government function" test, courts had been led to designate the licensing of 
drivers as within the bounds of state sovereignty, see United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 
1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978), while upholding federal regulation of traffic on public roads, see 
Friends of Earth v. Carey, 552 F2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977). The Court concluded that "[t]he 
constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic . . .  is elusive at 
best." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539. 
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democratic society.68 The New York and Printz Courts are indebted to 
Garcia for taking this radical stance, which propelled Tenth Amend­
ment jurisprudence out of the "traditional government function" rut 
and hence beyond its unhelpful focus on demarcating the "what" of 
state sovereignty as the primary means of precluding federal en­
croachment.69 In so doing, Garcia enabled the New York and Printz 
Courts to treat how federal regulation functions as a source of impor­
tant limitations on the federal government's exercise of its constitu­
tional authority under the Tenth Amendment. 
The New York and Printz Courts go beyond Garcia in their under­
standing of the means by which the principal federalism concerns of 
political accountability and prevention of tyranny must be protected. 
Presuming the federal political process sufficient to preserve the bal­
ance of power between state and federal government, the Garcia 
Court concluded that "[s]tate sovereign interests . . .  are more prop­
erly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of 
the federal system than by judicially crafted limitations on federal 
power."70 Printz and New York, on the other hand, clearly establish 
that, regardless of the political process by which laws are engendered, 
federal regulation that operates by commandeering the states violates 
the limitations on federal power implicit in the Tenth Amendment.71 
Still, New York and Printz were able to construct this new analytical 
68. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-46; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses 
and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2212-13, 2228, 2240 
(1998) (discussing the tension between principled constitutional adjudication and the de­
mands of flexible federalism and arguing for process·based, clear evidence requirements that 
focus on the source of federal power and need for federal action); Deborah Jones Merritt, 
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 12-14, 36 (1988) (rejecting National League of Cities' "traditional governmental func­
tion" basis for limiting the federal commerce power and arguing that the constitutional 
guarantee of a republican form of government produces a more workable concept of feder­
alism); Rapaczynski, supra note 61, at 359-68. Rapaczynski, following the Garcia Court, re­
jects the language of dual sovereignty employed by the Court and scholars in attempting to 
clarify the tension between state and federal power that underpins the federalist structure of 
our government. The fiction of a rigid divide is exposed by Garcia's conclusion that process 
may be the primary means of identifying appropriate exercises of state and federal power. 
Id. at 351-52, 356-57, 359-60. Rapaczynski notes that "the traditional concept of sovereignty 
simply obfuscates the fact that actual authority in the modem states resides in an often 
shifting configuration of political, economic, and social groups, with the state being only one 
of the contenders." Id. at 359 n.50. 
69. See Merritt, supra note 68, at 15 (noting the radical character of Garcia); Rapaczyn· 
ski, supra note 61, at 372-73. Rapaczynski argues that Garcia's reliance on the political pro· 
cess to tend the federalist balance of power does not exclude the imposition of real limita­
tions on the federal government's exercise of its legislative authority . .  Rather, Garcia's 
emphasis on the political process recognizes that substantive limits can only be meaningful if 
informed by a complex account of the nature of federalist institutions. Id. 
70. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. 
71. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
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framework for Tenth Amendment analysis based on legislative mode 
because Garcia razed the "traditional government function" edifice of 
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that had stood in its place. 
B. Federalism Implications of General Applicability 
Without challenging the validity of Garcia, the New York Court 
sidestepped the Garcia line of cases by identifying them as concerned 
with laws of "general applicability," that is, laws that apply to both 
states and private parties.72 Although the New York Court uses the 
term "laws of general applicability" as a term of art, the phrase used as 
such occurs nowhere in Garcia or the cases generally associated with 
it. To the degree that the concept is present in cases of the Garcia 
line, it is important solely as an indicator that the laws at issue do not 
seek to dominate the states in their sovereign relation to their citi­
zens.73 Nevertheless, the New York Court stated that the challenge to 
the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Act "presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of 
these cases, as this is not a case in which Congress has subjected a 
State to the same legislation applicable to private parties."74 The 
Court's distinction between federal laws that apply only to states and 
generally applicable laws that apply to both state and private activities, 
however, offers only a superficial basis for the constitutionality of a 
law under the Tenth Amendment.75 
The concern posed by laws that apply to the states but not private 
parties is that the federal government may use such legislation to 
regulate private parties indirectly without accepting the political and 
economic burden such regulation entails.76 This legislative indirection 
72 See New York, 505 U.S. at 160. The phrase appears to derive from a line of Free 
Exercise cases epitomized by Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. '8:72, '8:77-80 (1990), in 
which the Court reviewed the question of whether a facially neutral law (hence, "generally 
applicable") is constitutional under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment if a 
particular religious group were prejudicially affected by the law. 
73. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554; South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 
(1988); see also infra Section II.B.1. 
74. New York, 505 U.S. at 160. 
75. See New York, 505 U.S. at 201-02 (White, J., dissenting) (exposing the formalistic 
quality of the Court's analysis regarding laws of general applicability). With regard to the 
majority's distinction between federal statutes that regulate both states and private parties 
and those that regulate only state activity, Justice White asserts that "[i]n no case has the 
Court rested its holding on such a distinction." Id. at 201. Finding no support for the ma­
jority's suggestion that generally applicable laws per se constitute a lesser incursion on state 
sovereignty, Justice White astutely notes that "[t]he alleged diminution in state authority 
over its own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate restricts the activities of pri­
vate parties [as well]." Id. at202. 
76. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30; New York, 505 U.S. at 167-69. The Printz Court de­
scribes the federalist concerns raised by commandeering as follows: 
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poses a serious threat to the federalist principle of prevention of tyr­
anny through political accountability.77 Problems of accountability 
arise if voters mistakenly hold state officers responsible for actions 
those officers were forced to take under federal law, or if voters fail to 
hold the federal government responsible for imposing certain choices 
and costs on the states.78 Moreover, federal lawmakers will hold them­
selves less responsible to voters if they find ways to direct states to 
carry out federally prescribed programs.79 A federal law that seeks to 
impose the same constraints on both states and private parties is by 
definition not an instance of the federal government evading direct 
regulation of private conduct, and so it does not pose this threat to 
federalist values associated with commandeering.80 In short, general 
applicability is one indication that a law does not interfere with the 
balance of state and federal power in this way.81 
This notion of general applicability may also be a throwback to the 
ultimately unworkable "traditional government function" test pro­
pounded by National League of Cities and rejected by Garcia.152 To the 
degree that a statute is designed to regulate the activity of both states 
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal 
regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without 
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even 
when the States are not forced to absorb the costs . . .  they are still put in the position of 
taking the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects. 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. 
77. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 2200-05; Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Fed-
eralism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 V AND. L. REV. 1563, 1573-74 {1994). 
78. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 2201. 
79. See id. 
80. This is not to say that laws of general applicability, which operate predominantly in a 
preemptive mode, see infra Section II.B.1, are entirely free from accountability confusion. 
As Jackson notes, a certain level of confusion regarding public accountability inheres in the 
federalist structure established by the Constitution: "[A] federal system necessarily results 
in a more confusing situation for voters than does a unitary, centralized government. Stan­
dard preemption - the effect of federal law in negating the area in which state Jaw can op­
erate - can obscure the causes of inaction by state officials." Jackson, supra note 68, at 
2201-02 {footnote omitted). 
It should be noted that conditional preemption in some sense reduces this problem, in 
that it allows states to choose between implementation of federal standards and preemption 
in a field in which state activity affects the national welfare, a choice for which state citizens 
may justly hold the state, rather than the federal government, accountable. 
81. See Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 {7th 
Cir. 1998) ("[T]he purpose of drawing a distinction between laws of general applicability and 
laws directed exclusively at states is not to suggest that the former are always constitutional 
and the latter are always unconstitutional . . . .  Rather, the distinction is one indication how 
much a congressional enactment upsets tile structural balance between federal and state 
sovereignty, if at all."). 
82 See supra notes 29, 67-68 and accompanying text; Jackson, supra note 68, at 22rt7. 
As Jackson points out, tllere is no doubt tllat tile Printz Court remained mired to some ex­
tent in an arguably outdated "separate spheres" model of dual sovereignty. See id. at 2206. 
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and private individuals, it is less likely to be encroaching on an area of 
uniquely governmental function, as such functions will tend to be car­
ried out by states rather than individuals.83 The fact that an activity is 
carried out only by the states, however, is but one indicator that it may 
not fall within reach of federal regulatory power; that indicator is not 
in itself sufficient to render federal regulation of that activity per se 
unconstitutional. 
Because of the New York Court's failure to explain why generally 
applicable laws do not pose federalism problems, the Court's passing 
identification of the laws at issue in the Garcia line of cases as such has 
proven confusing to courts in evaluating the DPP A. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit, in Condon v. Reno, affirmed the lower court holding 
that the DPPA was unconstitutional on the grounds that it is not a law 
that applies equally to states and individuals.84 The Fourth Circuit ap­
parently concluded, from New York's and Printz's characterizations of 
the Garcia line of cases as concerned with laws of general applicabil­
ity, that federal laws regulating states as states would only be permis­
sible under the Tenth Amendment if they applied to both state and 
private parties. This reasoning is formalistic in that it fails to take ac­
count of the basis on which generally applicable laws are deemed to 
preserve federalist values. 
The mere fact that the DPPA does not take the form of a law of 
general applicability does not conclude the inquiry info its constitu­
tionality. For the same reasons that generally applicable laws tend to 
be unproblematic for federalism, laws taking the form of conditional 
preemption are equally so. New York and Printz distinguish permissi­
ble conditional preemption from impermissible commandeering with­
out making explicit the analytical connection between generally appli­
cable laws and preemptive ones.85 After articulating its anti­
commandeering rule, the New York Court simply asserts that "[t]he 
Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters 
directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation."86 This distinction 
between commandeering and preemption cuts closer to the quick of 
the federalist problem of separating efficacious exercises of federal 
authority that do not compromise federalist values, from federal over­
reaching that undermines a state's ability to be politically responsible 
to its citizens. 
Section II.B.1 examines South Carolina v. Baker as an instance of a 
case in the Garcia line that, in addition to fitting the descriptive cate­
gory of general applicability, operates through the mode of condi-
83. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 2207. 
84. 155 F.3d 453, 463 (4th Cir. 1998). 
85. See Hills, supra note 36, at 921. 
86. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992). 
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tional preemption. Section II.B.2 argues that the mode of conditional 
preemption encompasses all laws that offer the states a genuine choice 
between abandoning a regulatory field and implementing federal re­
quirements, regardless of whether the field involves regulation of pri­
vate as well as state activity. 
1. From General Applicability to Conditional Preemption: 
South Carolina v. Baker 
Although the New York Court explicitly stated that the Garcia line 
of cases should be applied in evaluating "laws of general applicabil­
ity," there is no indicator that these are the only cases to which the 
earlier line of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence should apply.87 Nei­
ther Garcia itself, nor Baker which followed and elaborated upon it, 
grounds the decision to uphold federal law in the identification of the 
law as a "law of general applicability."88 The New York Court's retro­
spective identification of the laws treated by the Garcia line of cases as 
"generally applicable" is descriptively accurate; yet, it should not be 
misconstrued as providing the legal underpinning or the limiting prin­
ciple on which these decisions were based. 89 
The law at issue in Garcia, correctly described by the New York 
Court as a law of general applicability, is more precisely characterized 
for federalism purposes as a law operating in the legislative mode of 
preemption. The conditions for preemption exist when the state and 
federal governments have concurrent power \vithin a particular field 
of regulation.90 In Garcia, the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority argued that control of mass-transit was a traditional state 
function, hence within state control;91 at the same time, prior Court 
decisions had extended the federal government's commerce power to 
intrastate activities, like the creation of a mass-transit system, that af­
fect interstate commerce.92 Hence, the prerequisite concurrent state 
and federal power was present, making preemption viable. 
87. See New York, 505 U.S. at 177-78. 
88. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 {1985); South 
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 {1988). 
89. See William A. Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A New Restriction on Con· 
gressional Power Vis-a-Vis the States, 55 Omo ST. LJ. Z37, 250-51 (1994) (arguing that the 
New York Court failed to adequately address prior Supreme Court precedent as embodied 
in the Garcia line of cases). 
90. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770. 
91. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530-31; Brief of San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author· 
ity, Garcia (No. 82-1913), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs file. 
92 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n, Inc. 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 {1981), for this proposition). 
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Preemption doctrine dictates that where federal and state laws 
conflict in.a field of concurrent power, federal law will prevail.93 More 
broadly, preemption doctrine allows that, even absent a contrary state 
law, the federal government may take regulatory possession of the 
field by passing legislation that makes manifest this intent.94 The un­
doubted constitutionality of the legislative mode of preemption has 
been grounded most frequently in the Supremacy Clause, and, less 
commonly, in the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution.95 
In other words, the mode of preemption is constitutional by virtue not 
only of the preeminence of federal law in areas of legitimate federal 
control, but also of the existence of a national interest that requires 
that a given field be uniformly regulated according to a single set of 
rules.96 Setting standards for employee working conditions - for ex­
ample, environmental regulation - is a field of this kind in which pre­
emption is appropriate.97 
Section 310 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") at issue in 
South Carolina v. Baker, also generally applicable to both state and 
private enterprises,98 differs from the law at issue in Garcia in that it 
operates in a conditionally preemptive mode. The provision of IRC 
section 310 that was challenged in the case barred ("preempted") the 
state issuance of unregistered ("bearer") bonds, but allowed the state 
to continue to issue bonds in compliance with federal registration re­
quirements.99 The national concern the law sought to address was the 
use of unregistered bonds as an instrument of tax evasion. 100 That 
concern was of self-evident national importance101 and probably would 
have justified complete federal preemption of the field. By making 
federal occupation of the bond-issuing field conditional on the state's 
decision not to implement federal requirements, the law departed 
from standard preemption. The challenged provision was upheld, 
however, on the grounds that it intervened directly in a state activity 
rather than commandeering the states to regulate a private activity ac­
cording to a federal regulatory scheme.102 In other words, it gave the 
93. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 770. 
94. See id. at 771-72. 
95. See id. at 773-74, 781-83. 
96. See id. at 781. 
97. See Hills, supra note 36, at 921. 
98. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 510 (1988). 
99. See id. at 511. 
100. See id. at 508-09 (stating that Internal Revenue Service studies indicated that unre­
ported income had grown from an estinlated range of $31.1 billion to $32.2 billion in 1973 to 
a range of $93.3 billion to $97 billion in 1981 ). 
101. See id. 
102 See id. at 514. 
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states a choice between preemption in the field of issuing bonds and 
continuing to be active in the field by bringing its issuing standards 
into compliance with federal registration requirements. 
The Baker Court relied and elaborated upon Garcia's approach to 
federalist problems, recognizing that compliance with federal preemp­
tion did not present the difficulties posed by federal commandeering 
of the states.103 The Court based its analysis on an assessment of the 
IRC's objectives as well as the mode in which it sought to accomplish 
them. The Court found that the IRC's regulation of state issuance of 
bonds did not violate federalist principles; the regulation did not seek 
to control the manner in which the states regulate private parties, and 
hence did not unduly interfere with political accountability or the po­
litical responsiveness of local government to the popular voice.104 
Rather, the Court recognized that any federal regulation demands 
compliance, which may be mischaracterized as "commandeering."105 
The Baker Court, taking its cues from Garcia, sought to hammer 
out a more analytical approach to assessing the federalist concerns 
presented by federal regulation of state activities. Notably, both the 
New York and Printz decisions recognize preemption of the kind at 
issue in Baker as a valid exercise of federal power.106 
2 Understanding the Limits of Conditional Preemption: 
New York v. United States 
As already noted, it is possible to reconcile the Garcia line of cases 
with New York and Printz by recognizing the Garcia line as concerned 
not simply with "laws of general applicability" but, more fundamen­
tally, with federal laws that preempt contrary state laws. The New 
York Court's assertion that Congress has the power to preempt state 
law implies a recognition of the constitutionality of federal laws that 
offer states a choice between preemption in a given field and continu­
ing to regulate in accordance with federal requirements. Printz makes 
this explicit.107 In recognition of the permissibility of conditional pre­
emption, the Printz Court cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. 
Mississippi ("FERC") as cases that justifiably upheld federal laws be­
cause compliance with federal standards under these laws was merely 
"a precondition to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-
103. See id. at514-15. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 514. 
106. See United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 925-27 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992). 
107. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-27. 
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empted field."108 This distinction between commandeering and condi­
tional preemption is central to evaluating the scope of the anti­
commandeering principle established in New York and Printz.109 
Some courts have read too narrowly New York's exemption of 
preemption from its anti-commandeering imperative and, as a result, 
have understood that exemption as applying exclusively to laws that 
preempt state regulation of private parties.11° This error derives from a 
misreading of the New York Court's statement that "where Congress 
has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce 
Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice 
of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having 
state law pre-empted by federal regulation."111 Although this pro­
nouncement is concerned with laws that regulate private parties, it 
does not suggest, as some courts have inferred,112 that federal preemp­
tion of state law is only permissible with regard to regulation of pri­
vate activity.113 In fact, that reading is directly at odds with the Court's 
earlier holding in Baker.114 
In Baker, the Court specifically upheld the Internal Revenue Code 
provision that essentially prohibited states from continuing to issue 
unregistered bonds on the grounds that "[s]ection 310 regulates state 
activities; it does not . . .  seek to control or influence the manner in 
108. See id. at 925-26. 
109. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, New York, Printz and Yeskey: The New 
Etiquette of Federalism, 1998 SUP. Cr. REV. 71, 82-83; Hills, supra note 36, at 917 (arguing 
that generally applicable laws should be exempted from the per se anti-commandeering rule 
of New York "not because they apply to private persons as well as nonfederal officials, but 
rather because such laws typically have the form of conditional preemption"). 
110. See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 463 n.6 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. 
Ct. 1753 (1999) (citing New York for the proposition that only where Congress has the 
power to regulate private parties may it impose laws that take on the form of conditional 
preemption). 
111. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167. 
112 See, e.g., Condon, 155 F3d at 463 n.6 ("The dissent contends that the DPP A is con­
stitutional because Congress could have 'preempted the field of motor vehicle information 
disclosure.' We disagree. Only 'where Congress has the authority to regulate private activity 
under the Commerce aa:use . . .  [may it] offer States the choice of regulating that activity 
according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.' "(in­
ternal reference omitted) (first emphasis added)). 
113. See Oklahoma ex reL Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F3d 
1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The Supreme Court has never suggested that the Tenth 
Amendment bars Congress from regulating state conduct merely because states are the only 
actors engaged in certain activity.''). 
114. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (7th Cir. 1998). The Travis Court 
locates Condon's overly narrow reading of New York in the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that 
Congress may regulate the states only through laws of general applicability, drawn from New 
York's observation that most recent Tenth Amendment cases have dealt with such laws. See 
id at 1006 ("Once again the word 'only' comes from the Fourth Circuit rather than the 
Supreme Court."). 
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which States regulate private parties."115 According to Baker, then, a 
federal law presenting states with a choice between preemption of a 
state activity (issuing bonds) and continuation of that activity in com­
pliance with federal guidelines is entirely constitutional where the con­
sequences of the state activity fall within Congress's enumerated pow­
ers.116 In order for New York to be consistent with past Supreme 
Court precedent, its preemption exception cannot be understood as 
applying only to federal laws that directly regulate private activities.117 
Because New York and Printz acknowledge the validity of laws 
operating in a preemptive mode as well as laws of general 
applicability, these decisions are consistent with such cases of the 
Garcia line as Baker. Conditional preemption respects the federalist 
concern for protecting political accountability and responsiveness, 
while enabling the federal government to intervene where necessary 
to accomplish a public good within its enumerated powers.U8 This 
kind of flexibility within the federalist structure of our government 
was deemed essential by Garcia.U9 New York and Printz simply 
constrain that flexibility by identifying commandeering as a mode of 
federal legislation that is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. 
These Courts relied on Garcia in shifting the focus of Tenth 
11S. South Carolina v. Baker, 48S U.S. SOS, S14 {1988). Section 310 of the IRC actually 
imposed a tax on income from state and local unregistered bonds. The Baker court assumed 
that this tax essentially prohibited states from issuing unregistered bonds by making them 
undesirable. See id. at S11. 
116. See id. at S26 {finding that a tax like that imposed by IRC section 310 on interest 
earned by holders of unregistered bonds in order to effectively prohibit issuance of such 
bonds, was within the federal government's constitutional taxing power). That the choice to 
comply with federal guidelines might require substantial effort on the part of state legislators 
and executives did not trouble the Baker court: "Such 'commandeering' is • . .  an inevitable 
consequence of regulating a state activity." Id. at S14. 
117. The dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit's Condon decision, supporting the lower 
court's finding that the DPPA was unconstitutional, relies on this argument in attempting to 
reconcile the Garcia line of cases with the Supreme Court's decisions in New York and 
Printz. See Condon, lSS F.3d at 468 {Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips asserts that "the 
legislation at issue in Garcia and Wyoming . • .  was immune to Tenth Amendment challenge 
not so much - if at all- because they applied equally to state and private actors as because 
they directly regulated state activities rather than using the 'States as implements of regula­
tion' of third parties." Id. 
118. The New York Court recognized conditional preemption as a mode of federal 
regulation that, by presenting states with a choice, could preserve the federalist values of 
political accountability and responsiveness: 
If state residents would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to 
problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the 
Federal Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated regula­
tory program, and they may continue to supplement that program to the extent state law is 
not pre-empted. 
New York, SOS U.S. at 168. 
119. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at S4S-46. 
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Amendment analysis beyond the particular activity regulated and 
towards the manner of regulation. 
ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DPPA: 
DISTINGUISHING PERMISSIBLE PREEMPTION 
FROM IMPERMISSIBLE COMMANDEERING 
The New York and Printz Courts recognized the constitutionality 
of federal preemption of state law, thereby affirming the distinction 
between preemption and impermissible federal commandeering of the 
states.120 Both Courts reiterated the constitutional viability of federal 
laws of the former kind, while holding that the laws of the latter type 
are inherently incompatible with the fundamental principles of feder­
alism.121 Section III.A argues that the DPPA is constitutional because, 
unlike the laws at issue in Printz and New York, it exemplifies condi­
tional preemption rather than commandeering. Section III.B com­
pares the DPP A to other laws that the Court has held constitutional in 
several cases in the Garcia line and that present less compelling in­
stances of conditional preemption than the DPP A. 
A. The DPPA Takes the Constitutionally Permissible Form of 
Conditional Preemption 
The courts that have failed to recognize the DPP A as an instance 
of conditional preemption have accordingly not recognized that the 
law falls outside the anti-commandeering rule established in Printz 
and New York. The two circuit courts that have held the DPPA un­
constitutional have objected to the benefit the federal government 
would wring from the states by requiring them to train their own 
DMV employees to distinguish valid from invalid requests for per-
120. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-26 ("In Hodel we . . .  concluded that the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 did not present the problem . . .  raised [by comman­
deering] because it merely made compliance with federal standards a precondition to con­
tinued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field"); New York, 505 U.S. at 160 ("Peti­
tioners . . •  do not dispute that under the Supremacy Clause Congress could, if it wished, pre­
empt state radioactive waste regulation. Petitioners contend only that the Tenth Amend­
ment limits the power of Congress to regulate in the way it has chosen.") 
121. See, e.g., ; Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-26 ("In Hodel we . . .  concluded that the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 did not present the problem . . .  raised [by 
commandeering] because it merely made compliance with federal standards a precondition 
to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field."); New York, 505 U.S. at 178 
("No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not 
give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution instead gives 
Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regula­
tion."). 
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sonal information under the DPPA requirements.122 Only one circuit 
court and one district court that have considered the law have recog­
nized that the Act offers states the alternative of pulling out of the 
field entirely by simply closing their records to the public.123 While 
recognizing the preemption alternative afforded by the DPP A, the dis­
trict court nevertheless dismissed it as insufficient to address the ac­
countability concerns at the heart of the anti-commandeering rule.124 
Laws taking the form of conditional preemption are generally 
deemed constitutional because they allow the federal government to 
regulate in areas of particularly national concern without violating 
fundamental federalist values. Such laws preserve state autonomy by 
offering states a choice between continuing to regulate in a particular 
field in accordance with federally prescribed standards or abandoning 
the field entirely to direct federal control.125 This basic characteristic 
of choice is more than a formal quality of conditional preemption. 
The distinction offered in Printz between permissible federal laws 
that apply incidentally to the states and impermissible federal laws 
whose "whole object [is] to direct the functioning of the state execu­
tive" is consistent with the view of commandeering as something more 
than mere compliance.126 The federal government is guilty of imper­
missible commandeering when it could accomplish its particular goal 
by directly regulating the behavior of private parties but instead 
chooses to achieve its ends by ordering the states to constrain their 
citizens in a particular way. In such a case, the problem of political ac­
countability is obvious, in that the federal government shirks direct 
imposition on private parties and instead seeks through its legislation 
to conscript the states into doing its dirty work. Because DMVs are a 
primary site for the accumulation of personal information about a 
state's citizens and because individuals are generally not engaged in 
collecting such information on a state-wide basis, however, the federal 
government cannot regulate the national market in DMV records by 
122. See, e.g., Pryor v. Reno, 171 F3d 1281, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999); Condon, 155 F.3d 
at 460. 
123. See Oklahoma ex reL Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 
1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) ("If states do not wish to comply with those regulations, they may 
stop disseminating information in their motor vehicle records to the public."); Travis v. 
Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 163 F3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998). 
124. See Travis, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 928. The court objects to the DPPA's preemption al­
ternative for failing to deflect accountability from the states: "That states may avoid obliga­
tions imposed by the act by 'choosing' to close their motor vehicle records to the public en­
tirely does not avoid this problem because States, not the federal government, will remain 
accountable to their citizens for such a decision." Id. It is not clear, however, why the state 
should not be held accountable for the decision to allow its regulatory power to be pre­
empted instead of choosing to regulate in accordance with federal requirements. 
125. See Hills, supra note 36, at 926-27. 
126. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (emphasis removed). 
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directly regulating private parties.127 Therefore, the most direct 
method of accomplishing the DPPA's objective is to target state activ­
ity. 
Unlike the DPPA, the laws at issue in New York and Printz 
impermissibly sought to dictate the states' regulation of private parties 
rather than directly regulate state activity or private behavior or 
both.128 The "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act under examination in New York interfered with the 
states' relation to private citizens by requiring the state to take title to 
the waste produced by in-state private waste producers. The New 
York Court recognized Congress's right to regulate the conduct of pri­
vate waste producers directly but objected to the mode of regulation 
chosen here because it impermissibly commandeered the states to 
regulate private citizens in a federally prescribed manner.129 Similarly, 
in Printz, the challenged provision of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act sought to dictate the relation between the state and its 
citizens by requiring state officers to conduct background checks on 
prospective handgun purchasers.130 The DPPA, by contrast, accom­
plishes federal objectives by operating directly on the relevant state 
activity rather than seeking to reach the conduct of individuals by ma­
nipulating the states' relation to their citizens. 
In exempting laws of general applicability from the prohibition on 
commandeering, the Printz and New York Courts focused on prohib­
iting only congressional legislation that accomplishes indirectly an 
objective that the federal government could as easily accomplish di­
rectly. This is not to suggest, however, that the only federal laws that 
do not threaten federalist principles are generally applicable laws.131 
127. See Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety ("ODPS"), 161 F3d at 1271. The ODPS court 
cites with approval Judge Phillips's dissenting opinion in Condon, stating that "it is no basis 
for invalidating [the DPPA] . . .  that no private equivalent could be found in the particular 
area of regulation." Id. (citing Condon, 155 F.3d at 469 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). The ODPS court further asserts that "[t]he Supreme Court has 
never suggested that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from regulating state conduct 
merely because states are the only actors engaged in certain activity." Id. 
128. See Travis, 163 F3d at 1004 ("[T]he basic distinction between cases such as [Baker] 
and cases such as New York is that states and privates parties may be the objects of regula­
tion, although states cannot be compelled to become regulators of private conduct."). 
129. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-77 (1992); see also Condon, 155 
F.3d at 466 (Phillips, J., dissenting) ("[T]he end object of the [DPPA] . . .  is not the indirect 
regulation of private conduct - here information use - by forcing the states directly to 
regulate that conduct, in the way that the states were held impermissibly compelled to regu­
late the waste-handling conduct of private parties in New York v. United States."). But see 
Richard D. Weiner, New York v. United States: Federalism and the Disposal of Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste, 34 NAT. REsOURCES J. 197, 216-17 (1994). Weiner is skeptical of this 
reading of New York. He argues that the Court's failure to define the phrase "regulatory 
program" leaves an impermissibly wide range of federal statutes open to challenge. See id. 
130. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-31. 
131. See supra Section II.B. 
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Where a federal law seeks to achieve a nationally important objective 
that falls within the government's enumerated powers and can do so 
only by regulating states as states, the law cannot be characterized as 
commandeering.132 In such a case, the object of the law is not to com­
mandeer the states; rather, the law overrides state policy with the ob­
ject of protecting a national interest that falls under the federal gov­
ernment's power to regulate.133 Moreover, state compliance with a 
demand for federal access to such state information is recognized by 
Printz and New York as probably too de minimus to qualify as com­
mandeering of the kind these cases prohibit.134 Hence, it seems likely 
that implementation of the DPPA would be within the federal gov­
ernment's institutional capacity. 
Although the DPPA fails to articulate a precise federal regulatory 
mechanism for the distribution of DMV information should states 
choose to abandon the field entirely by closing their DMV records, it 
does not misuse preemption as merely an empty threat.135 The fact 
that a federal law preempting state law fails to specify a regulatory al­
ternative is not in itself sufficient to render the law unconstitutional.136 
The preemption alternative offered by the DPP A is valid because it 
simply is not a threat but a viable solution to the problem the law is 
designed to address.137 In this respect, it resembles the prohibition on 
state issuance of unregistered bonds offered by IRC section 301 and is 
distinguishable from PURP A's exemption alternative that did nothing 
to address the national energy crisis.138 
132 See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515 (1988). 
133. The standard for determining what constitutes a "national interest" is not alto­
gether clear. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. While Section I.B suggests that 
regulation of the distribution of private DMV information might be such an interest, resolu­
tion of the standard for determining what constitutes a "national interest" is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
134. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
135. A better drafted DPPA might give some outline of the federal regulatory scheme 
that the government intends to implement should States choose preemption over continued 
regulation in accordance with federal regulations. Even where Congress fails to provide an 
explicit alternative regulatory mechanism to replace the preempted state regulatory scheme, 
however, it nevertheless acts within its preemption power. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 766 (1982). 
136. See id. 
137. See Hills, supra note 36, at 925 ("[I]f the only purpose of preemption of state or 
local policy is simply to pressure state or local governments into enacting regulations ac­
cording to federal standards, then the preemption would be just as unconstitutional as an 
outright demand for the regulatory services."). 
138. See id. at 924-26. Hills objects to the FERC Court's failure to consider the question 
whether the preemption provision of PURP A was related to achieving the law's stated pur­
pose: 
[The Court's] reasoning does not explain how the implicit threat of preemption has any 
nexus to the goal of insuring that utilities implement federal energy-saving standards. After 
all, unless unregulated utilities are somehow more inclined toward conservation of energy 
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B. Conditional Preemption as Exemplified in FERC v. Mississippi 
and South Carolina v. Baker Assists in Assessing the DP PA 
A look at the Supreme Court's use of preemption analysis in 
upholding other federal regulatory laws highlights the validity of the 
DPP A. Under the DPP A, states have options similar to those upheld 
in Baker and options less coercive than those upheld in FERC v. 
Mississippi. 
In FERC, the Court upheld a provision of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act ("PURP A"), relying on preemption analysis 
to justify its decision.139 The federal law at issue in FERC required 
state regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities to consider im­
plementing federal regulatory standards to combat a nationwide en­
ergy crisis resulting from utilities' unregulated use of natural gas and 
oil in the generation of electricity.140 It also gave the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission the separate power to exempt energy pro­
ducers entirely from state regulation.141 The Supreme Court found 
that occupying the field of public utility regulation in a time of na­
tional energy crisis was a constitutional exercise of federal preemptive 
power.142 
The FERC Court held the challenged provisions of PURP A 
constitutional on the grounds that they operated in the permissible 
mode of conditional preemption.143 The Court analogized PURPA to 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act upheld in Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n, Inc. that gave states the 
option of either regulating strip mining in compliance with federal 
than regulated utilities, the preemption of utility regulation does nothing to advance, and 
might even impede, PURP A's purpose. 
Id. at 926. 
139. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 742. 
140. See id. at 745-46. 
141. See id. at 759. 
142 See id. at 745, 763-64. It is worth noting that the Court appears to limit its recogni­
tion of the federal government's power to preempt regulation of utilities by specifying pri­
vate actors: "Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as private rather 
than state activity is concerned . . . .  " Id at 765. The Court's apparent reservation of the 
question of whether the same regulation was equally unproblematic as applied to state ac­
tivity must be understood in light of the jurisprudential environment in which FERC was 
decided. At the time of the decision, National League of Cities, which forbade federal regu­
lation of states "as states" in areas of "traditional state functions," was still good law. It 
seems likely that, had FERC been decided after Garcia overturned National League of Cit­
ies, the Court would not have equivocated on the question whether a federal law regulating 
state as well as private activity in a field of self-evident national concern could be deemed a 
valid exercise of Congress's preemption power. 
143. See id. at 768 n.30 {describing PURPA as "a scheme that gives the States a choice 
between regulating in conformity with federal requirements, or abandoning regulation in a 
given field"). 
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environmental protection standards or abandoning the field to the 
Secretary of the Interior who was charged with implementing a federal 
program.144 The Court found that in the field of energy regulation, as 
in the field of strip mining regulation, "the Federal Government could 
have pre-empted all . . .  regulations; instead, it allowed the States to 
enter the field if they promulgated regulations consistent with federal 
standards."145 The Court adjudged PURP A unproblematic for Tenth 
Amendment purposes because the law operated by conditional 
preemption, giving states a choice while legitimately seeking to protect 
a national interest.146 
PURP A is a less compelling instance of conditional preemption 
than the DPPA, however, in that the choice PURPA offers the states 
is less genuine and, so, more coercive. Because the law fails to provide 
the possibility of federal regulation of energy producers as an alterna­
tive in the event of state default, the broad preemption power that the 
law grants the FERC acts as a federal threat of complete deregulation 
should states refuse to consider federal regulatory standards.147 As 
such, the preemption provision may act to coerce states into imple­
menting federal standards rather than providing them with a bona fide 
choice, since deregulation could in no sense ameliorate the national 
energy crisis.148 In this respect, PURP A differs significantly from the 
DPPA. Federal preemption of the field of DMV record distribution 
by closing state DMV records to the public would clearly address the 
privacy and safety concerns that motivated the DPPA by keeping the 
personal information contained in DMV records out of the interstate 
marketplace. The DPP A's preemption alternative, then, unlike the 
preemption alternative provided by PURP A, offers a bona fide means 
of addressing the concern the law was designed to remedy. 
144. See id. at 764-65 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288-290). 
145. FERC, 456 U.S. at 764. 
146. See id. at 769-70 & n.33. 
147. See Merritt, supra note 68, at 64-65. According to Merritt, "PURPA • • .  required 
the states either to consider the proposed federal standards or to abandon all regulation of 
their electric utilities . . . .  The 'choice' embodied in PURPA, therefore, was illusory." Id. at 
65 (footnote omitted). 
148. See Hills, supra note 36, at 921-27. Hills argues that certain "conditions" associated 
with preemption may be unconstitutional, adding a further constraint to the federal govern­
ment's use of conditional preemption to exercise control over certain state-regulated fields. 
Hills sketches a judicial approach to preemption that might identify instances of misuse, 
"prohibit[ing] conditional preemption of state or local policies whenever (1) the condition 
that the nonfederal government must meet would, if imposed unconditionally, be unconsti­
tutional, and (2) Congress threatened preemption of nonfederal policy merely to gain lever­
age to extract compliance with the condition." Id. at 924. The challenged provisions of 
PURP A were of the latter kind. 
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The provision of the Internal Revenue Code at issue in South 
Carolina v. Baker resembles the DPPA in that it does not have the co­
ercive potential of PURP A but rather presents the states with a 
genuine choice. The provisions of the IRC at issue in Baker had as 
their objective the elimination of "unregistered bonds" that had be­
come an instrument of tax evasion.149 The Court found that because 
the issuance of such bonds was of national concern, the federal gov­
ernment was justified in requiring states to eliminate the undesirable 
effects of that activity either by turning over the regulatory field to the 
federal government or complying with federal registration require­
ments.150 Like the DPPA, then, IRC section 301 was a valid exercise 
of the federal government's power of conditional preemption in an 
area of national concern. 
Nevertheless, the alternatives presented by IRC section 301 and 
the DPP A - withdrawal from the field or continued regulation in 
compliance with federal standards - necessarily demand some legisla­
tive cooperation from the states, in the form of amendments to or re­
peal of existing laws.151 The Baker Court saw no coercion or comman­
deering implicit in the demand for state cooperation. Rather, 
recognizing that "[a]ny federal regulation demands compliance," the 
Baker Court found no constitutional defect in the fact that "a State 
wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative and 
sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regu­
lating that activity."152 
CONCLUSION 
The DPPA, then, is a constitutional instance of the federal gov­
ernment's use of conditional preemption to achieve an interest of na­
tional importance that the separate states are not motivated to achieve 
independently. By giving states a choice between adopting federal re­
strictions and withdrawing from the field of regulating DMV informa­
tion distribution entirely, the federal government is in no sense coerc­
ing the states into implementing federal regulations. For that reason, 
the DPP A poses none of the political accountability problems pre­
sented by laws that commandeer the states. At most, the DPP A al­
lows the federal government to clear the way for federal regulation in 
this domain wherever a state chooses preemption over implementa­
tion of federal requirements. Closing state DMV records to the public 
149. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 509 {1988). 
150. See id. at 508-09, 514-15; see also Hills, supra note 36, at 918-21. 
151. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003-04 {7th Cir. 1998) (relying on Baker in up­
holding the DPPA). 
152 Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15. 
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is a reasonable means of controlling the problem of unregulated dis­
tribution of personal information. The DPPA is, therefore, a constitu­
tional exercise of the federal commerce power in that it does not vio­
late basic federalist principles of political accountability and 
responsiveness, but rather operates in the permissible mode of condi­
tional preemption to regulate a domain properly within federal con­
trol. 
